INTRODUCTION
The highly interactive and diverse nature of modern day systems has made high reliability a central issue in computer system design.
it is not.
in general, feasible to guarantee a perfect system, either in hardware or in software. Accordingly, depending on the nature of the application. it is important to design into the system the ability either to continue operation in the event of a failure or to react to a failure in a predictable manner.
Theoretical models can only deal with a restricted class of problems.
Most often it is the problems outside the range of theoretical models t which cause the most severe malfunctions. Accordingly. at this stage there is no better substitute for results based on actual measurements and experimentation. An experimental study provides not only a viem of the end product but also gives some insight into persistent problems.
This information can be very valuable in designing new systems.
This paper describes the measurement and analysis of hard CPU and memory errors, and system activity at the Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center (SLAC) computational facility. The authors' approach has been to start with a substantial body of empirical data on system load and failures. On the basis of these measurements several experiments mere conducted to examine the dependence of hard failures on system activity.
The salient features of the measurement process and important results are outlined below:
1. The present study concentrates on hard CPU related errors. A measurable number of the failures (between 15 -25 percent)' were
Between 75 -85 percent of all errors were temporary (Iransient or intermittent) and are discussed in [(yer 82b] and [Rossetti 813. estimated to be hard failures (CPU and main memory).
2. The measurement process is automatic; it captures a detailed internal view of the system. especially under failure conditions.
3.
From the measurements, a completely new data base of failures and workload was established. The workload and failure data were combined in order to match failures with workloads at the times of failure.
The measurements and statistical experiments clearly demonstrate
a non-linear increase in the risk, of hard CPU related errors, due to increased values of workload variables. Examples are CPU utilization, input/output rate, and interrupt rates.
A representative measurement is illustrated in Fig. 1 . which shows how an increase in the system CPU usage, SYSCPU, (a measure of the system overhead; a fraction between 0 and 1) can result in higher risk of hardware failures in the CPU and main memory. The horizontal axis is the workload variable; the vertical axis is the risk of error. Modeling details will be given later in this paper. Even though the exact nature of this dependency is not fully understood, it uould appear that that computing systems, uhich need maximum reliability at their peak load, require a re-evaluation of their reliability projections.
An important, and as yet unansuered question is whether an increased level of system activity results in an increased level of harduare failures. In particular, it is important to determine uhether hard failures in logic elements (CPU and storage) are also workload dependent i.e., does higher system motivity result in a higher level of CPU and memory failures.
Some evidence to this effect was available from an early analysis of failures on the SLAC Triplex [Iyer 82a3. The study found a strong correlation between the occurrence of hard failures and the load on the system, as measured by variables such as the paging rate and the jobstep processing rate. All failures were considered, not simply the ones which led to system service interruptions. Most importantly the effects were such that the average failure rate for various system components varied cyclicly over a band of significant width as determined by the daily load variations. Fig. 2 
TABLE I
Sample error data (EREP) 
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In general, SMF data consists of records giving resource utilization figures for jobs, files, I/0 devices, and a potpourri of statistics gathered and written on a periodic basis. For this work we use the type 4 (Step) record, which holds statistics for each job step as it completes execution, and the type I (Wait) record, written roughly every 10 minutes. which summarises global system utilization during that 10 minute period.
With careful processing SMF can provide excellent workload statistics, especially when high resolution results are not needed.
To obtain more detailed information about transient behavior in the CPU we implemented an interrupt rate monitor, called INTRACK. There are four classes of interrupts in the IBM 370 architecture:z
External (EXT)
Used by the operating system for clocks and inter-CPU communication.
2. Supervisor Call (SVC) -Caused by any SVC instruction. Used for operating system services, such as: memory allocation, synchronization, 1/O, timing, etc.
Program (PROS)
Program traps due to arithmetic conditions (e.g. division by zero), invalid operations, or page faults.
Input/Output (I/O) -From completion of 1/O operations.

The interrupt monitor (INTRACK) archived the interrupt data along
with the SMF data described above. Table 2 summarizes the sources of data for the workload information.
z Machine check interrupts are not considered here because they are already collected in the EREP data. 
OVERVIEW OF THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
An objective of the measurement system was to make data management as automatic as possible so that it is unnecessary to know the particulars of operating systems, software monitors, record formats, and the like.
The Statistical Analysis System (hereafter called SAS) [SAS 79] provided
a rich environment for data handling, in addition to its procedures for statistical analysis. Once a few programs were written to capture and reduce the raw data, the information was immediately built into SAS data bases (called SAS data sets), on which the full power of SAS could be used to sort, select, merge, and extract information. More than 50 SAS programs, some very simple, were written to perform a variety of data handling operations on the data bases. This section discusses the system as a whole, describing the flow of data in general terms. Later.
..
Awl important components such as error clustering and workload smearing are covered in detail.
The transformation of raw workload and error data into usable data bases for analysis is performed by a collection of programs, some written in PL/I and many written in SAS. Refer to Figure 3 for the organization of these processors and the flow of data through them as they are described in the following sections. Workload processing begins with a program written to select and condense a specified set of SMF record types. This program is used to process the thirty reels of tape comprising the archived Slif data from 1979 to the present.
five minute intervals and smearing
A number of workload variables are defined to provide estimates of various characteristics of system load throughout the three year measurement period. They are summarized in Table 3 . It is also interesting to note that at a few rare points batch CPU seems to be greater than the total. This is due to the averaging algorithm's smearing of a job's CPU usage evenly over the job's duration while the total CPU figure is derived from a 10-minute global system total.
To study longer-range loading effects we also built a data base of one-hour smeared workload vectors. Each one-hour point is derived from the five-minute smeared data by averaging the twelve five-minute points in that hour and tagging the new point with the starting time of that hour.
There are 8760 such vectors in a non-leap year. Another reason for creating the one-hour data is to test whether system crashes occurring soon after CPU failures cause the five-minute averages in the period preceding the failure to be artificially decreased. This could happen because jobs executing at the time of the crash would not contribute to the smeared totals as they should. A preliminary analysis showed this not to be a problem. Table 4 . 
COMBINING WORKLOAD anD ERROR DATA (MATCH)
The final and most important step of the data base building process is the matching of errors and workload. By matching we mean the combining of each error point with information on system workload at the time of the error. The clustered error points are processed sequentially and for each point:
(1) The time of the five-minute interval Preceding the error is calculated, and (2) used as a key to locate its corresponding workload observation. Then (3) the vector of workload variables from that observation is merged into the error observation.
In order to determine the load at the time of failure, the 5-minute load averages (which we refer to as smeared averages) were merged with the EREP log. The load at failure was taken to be the load in a five minute interval prior to the failure to eliminate perturbations from system error recovery or a system crash. 
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Note that the interval containing the failure is not used because of the measurement distortion that can be caused by error recovery activities, and the fact that the system may not continue to run after the error.
Also, the exigencies of a system crash may prevent the operating system from gathering workload and accounting statistics.
In the case of one-hour averaged workload measurements. the algorithm is the same except that the previous hour's load is used.
SUMMARY f ILitA eASI
Summarising the above presentations, the following major sets of data were created:
Clustered and unclustered "pure" errors -from which standard failure analysis can be drawn to obtain a number of statistics, e.g. mean time to failure, hazard with time, etc. See [Shooman 1968 ] for more information.
Three years of workload information -also useful for studies not necessarily related to reliability.
These points exist in both five-minute and one-hour granularities.
Errors matched with workload -in both the five-minute and one-hour forms.
These observations can be used to study the connection between load and errors in large computer systems.
ANALYSIS
WORKLOAD AND ERROR ANALYSIJ
The data consisted of three years of load/failure measurements, 1979,
and 1981.
The 1981 data contains additional measurements made by our special purpose interrupt monitor. Initially, we analyzed each year separately.
Since there was no significant difference in the 1979 and 1980 results, it was considered appropriate to combine the corresponding 22 load-failure data.
Of the thirteen workload measures collected for the study, four mere chosen to be studied for 1979 and 1980. They were:
1. COREUThe sum of memory allocated by batch jobs (K bytes).
EXCP 3 -
The [/0 initiatation rate by batch jobs (Q/Os per second).
3. SYSCPU -CPU utilization for system. i.e. non-batch, tasks (a fraction between 0 and 1).
TOTCPU -Total CPU usage (a fraction between 0 and 1).
For 1981 the following interrupt measurements were also included:
1. SYC -Supervisor calls (rate per second).
2. 10 1-/0 interrupts, completion of 1/0 operations (rate per second).
PROGProgram interrupts (rate per second).
Measures such as the SYSCPU and 10 provide a measure of the system interactive load, while measures such as TOTCPU provide a general view of the CPU usage. The variable "BATCPU", derived from the difference between is a direct measure of batch usage.
Recall that the data base developed contains not only the values for the specified morkload variables to a five minute resolution but also the values of the same variables matched with failure times. The workload (or load) is assumed to be a discrete random variable for this discussion.
The second is the joint distribution of failure and the workload measure:
f(x) = Pr (failure occurs and load = x).
In this expression, failures and load values are represented as they / occur on an actual system, where favored loads contribute more to the distribution than loads of low probability.
To remove this effect me divide f(x) by the associated load probability 1(x). 
1(x)
Therefore g(x) can be thought of as the probability of a failure at a given load when ill loads Mn equally represented; it is the conditional failure probability. In the figure g(x) represents the conditional probablities arranged by increasing x (workload). Note that, since each of these probablities are calculated independently. gx) is not a probability distribution in the regular sense of the term.
S s A commonplace analogy to illustrate the above distinction is that automobiles travelling at 150 mph have a higher probability of accident tlan those travelling at 55 mph. However, there are far more accidents for autos going 55. To obtain an accurate representation of the risks involved in travelling at high speed, we must divide the number of accidents occurring at each speed by the numbgr of autos travelling at that speed. As a general observation we note that, where the difference between 2(x) and f(x) is considerable, we might expect to see a workload dependency in the failures. If A(x) and f(x) are similar, the relationship is probably not significant. A g(x) distribution weighted in favor of
higher workload values will clearly generate a higher risk of failure as the load increases.
It would appear from the g(x) plots for SYSCPU and 10 that higher values of these measures () 50 for 10) contribute more significantly to hard failures than the lower values.
Examining the plots for TOTCPU we note that, as measured by CPU utilization, the system was heavily loaded most of the time. The 2(x) and g(x) plots for TOTCPU show considerable similarity. It would therefore appear from this cursory analysis that failures are not induced by higher execution rates, as measured by CPU usage alone.
In order to quantify this effect, in particular to determine exactly the risk or "hazard" associated with higher workload values, we employed what we refer to as a "load hazard" model, the development and application of which is discussed in the next section. 
THE LOAD HAZARD MODEL
The object of the analysis was to determine: 1. Does a higher level of system utilization result in a higher risk of failure than a lower level?
2. Is the relationship linear with the workload variables, or is there a nonlinear increasing effect?
In practical terms, if such an effect exists, it is expected that the load will act as a stress factor.
For this purpose we developed and validated a load-hazard model which formed the basis for our tests. In close analogy with with the classical hazard rate in reliability theory [Shooman 68 ], z(x) measures the incremental risk involved in increasing the workload from x to x+Ax' (e.g. if the system is currently 6 In applying the load hazard model to our data we made a simplifying assumption that the workload monotonically increases until failure occurs. This is a conservative assumption which was made primarily to simplify some cumbersome aspects of the data analysis.
It has the additional advantage of allowing us to estimate a lower bound on the workload related risk (if any). This is due to the fact that under the assumption of a monotonically increasing workload, factors such as cycling (between low and high usage) and other random variations are ignored. It is well known that such stresses only serve to add to the hazard rate [Kujowski 78 The numerator of z(x) was determined from g(x). The survival probability in the denominator (i.e. the probability of no failure in the load interval (O,x)) was for practical purposes found to be very close to the probability of reaching a given workload or higher (determined from the workload distribution 1(x)). This is simply due to the fact that, in our data, failure events are much fewer than the five minute workload samples. Consequently, most often, when a given workload is reached no failure has occurred (i.e. failures are quite infrequent).
If z(x)
increases with x, it should be clear that there is an increasing risk of a failure as the workload variable increases.
If,
however, z(x) remains constant for increasing x, we may surmise that no increased risk is involved.
Note that in our definition of load hazard we have removed the variability of system load by using the conditional probability g(x). This of course is not true in practice since load is best described as a random variable with a probability distribution; it is simply the associated load distribution, A(x), defined above. In order to determine the hazard for a particular load pattern, we must multiply the associated load probability by the hazard calculated in (1).
Denoting by za(x)
the transformed hazard, we have
28 ie refer to the hazard z(x), as defined in (1), as the fundamental hazard. This is because it can be thought of as an inherent property of a particular system and is not subject to varying load patterns. when a varying load pattern is taken into account, it can be thought of as "picking out" aspects of the fundamental hazard function. This hazard z*(x) defined in (2) will be referred to as the apparent hazard, since it is closely dependent on the load distribution.
HAZARD PLOTS
The generation of the hazard plots and associated statistics involved U extensive data processing. In each hazard plot, z(x) or za(x) is calculated and plotted as a function of a chosen workloaa variable, x. In developing hazard plots for the load-failure data, there is an important difference between the real and the artificially created data. This lies in the fact that, while an artifical data base has specific dependencies seeded into it, in the real world, failures can occur due to a number of causes. Examples are: temperature, humidity, random noise, mechanical failures, and design errors, some of which are unrelated to our study. Those factors not related to load can be expected to behave as noise in a load-failure analysis. If these other factors are predominant, we can expect to find no discernable pattern in our hazard plots
i.e. they should appear as uncorrelated clouds. This is well understood in any statistical study of dependencies.
An easily discernable pattern, on the other hand, would indicate that the load-failure dependency dominates others.
The strength of such a relationship can be measured through regression. Figures 10, 11 
75).
There is also evidence in the general reliability literature which relates low and high usage rates, of avionic and navigational equipment with corresponding reliability behaviour (see [Shurman 78 ] and EKujouski 78] for details). It is to be noted that in each of these two studies a significant component of the system was electronic or digital. Our measurements show that the effect is not negligible in smaller devices.
The design of computer systems will be greatly aided if this type of analysis can help uncover cause and effect relationships in hardware U errors.
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